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ABSTRACT	
The	advancement	of	 technology	 in	 the	 contemporary	era	has	
facilitated	the	emergence	of	information	warfare,	which	includes	the	
deployment	of	information	as	a	weapon	against	an	adversary.	This	
is	done	using	a	number	of	tactics	such	as	the	use	of	media	and	social	
media	 to	 spread	 propaganda	 and	 disinformation	 against	 an	
adversary	as	well	as	the	adoption	of	software	hacking	techniques	to	
spread	 viruses	 and	 malware	 into	 the	 strategically	 important	
computer	systems	of	an	adversary	either	to	steal	confidential	data	or	
to	 damage	 the	 adversary’s	 security	 system.	 Due	 to	 the	 intangible	
nature	of	the	damage	caused	by	the	information	warfare	operations,	
it	 becomes	 challenging	 for	 international	 law	 to	 regulate	 the	
information	 warfare	 operations.	 The	 unregulated	 nature	 of	
information	 operations	 allows	 information	 warfare	 to	 be	 used	
effectively	by	states	and	nonstate	actors	to	gain	advantage	over	their	
adversaries.	 Information	 warfare	 also	 enhances	 the	 lethality	 of	
hybrid	warfare.	Therefore,	it	is	the	need	of	the	hour	to	arrange	a	new	
convention	 or	 devise	 a	 new	 set	 of	 rules	 to	 regulate	 the	 sphere	 of	
information	warfare	to	avert	the	potential	damage	that	it	can	cause	
to	international	peace	and	security.	
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I.	INTRODUCTION	Information	 warfare	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 multifarious	strategies	 aimed	 at	 harming	 the	 reputation	 or	 informational	infrastructure	 of	 an	 adversary.1	 This	 tactic	 can	 be	 employed	 in	times	 of	 both	 peace	 and	 war.2	 In	 particular,	 the	 information	warfare	 strategy	 is	 relied	 upon	 widely	 by	 the	 actors	 of	 hybrid	warfare.3	 States	 and	 nonstate	 actors	 involved	 in	 waging	 hybrid	warfare	 employ	 information	 warfare	 tactics	 either	 to	 demonize	their	 adversary	 by	 spreading	 disinformation,	 fake	 news,	 and	propaganda	 or	 to	 harm	 the	 online	 security	 protocols	 of	 their	adversary.4	For	instance,	surreptitious	and	sudden	online	attacks	on	 an	 adversary’s	 cyberspace	 via	 hacking,	 the	 stealing	 of	 an	adversary’s	 confidential	 data	 adversary,	 or	 the	 deployment	 of	social	media	 campaigns	 to	 spread	 rumors	 against	 the	 adversary	are	 some	 of	 the	 various	 tactics	 pursued	 within	 the	 sphere	 of	information	warfare.5	In	short,	information	warriors	rely	on	using	information	 as	 a	 precursor	 to	 causing	 intangible	 damage	 to	 the	adversary.6	 The	 intangible	 damage	 can,	 sometimes,	 also	 bring	tangible	 damage	 with	 it.	 For	 instance	 a	 virus	 attack	 on	 the	command	and	control	systems	of	an	enemy’s	jet	fighters	can	hinder	
 1.	 See	LAWRENCE	T.	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	INFORMATION	WARFARE	AND	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	1	(1998).	2.	 VINCENT	F.	HENDRICKS	&	MADS	VESTERGAARD,	REALITY	LOST:	MARKETS	OF	ATTENTION,	MISINFORMATION	AND	MANIPULATION	69	(2018).	3.	 See,	e.g.,	Przemyslaw	Furgacz,	Russian	Information	War	in	the	Ukrainian	Conflict,	in	COUNTERING	HYBRID	THREATS:	LESSONS	LEARNED	FROM	UKRAINE	207	(Niculae	Iancu	et	al.	eds.,	2016).		
4.	 See	id.	See	also	Cristian	Barna,	The	Road	to	Jihad	in	Syria:	Using	SOCMINT	to	Counter	
the	Radicalization	of	Muslim	Youth	in	Romania,	in	COUNTERING	RADICALISATION	AND	VIOLENT	EXTREMISM	AMONG	YOUTH	TO	PREVENT	TERRORISM	193	(Marco	Lombardi	et	al.	eds.,	2015).		5.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1.	6.	 Alexander	Nitu,	International	Legal	Issues	and	Approaches	Regarding	Information	
Warfare,	in	PROCEEDINGS	OF	THE	6TH	INTERNATIONAL	CONFERENCE	ON	INFORMATION	WARFARE	AND	SECURITY	201	(2011).		
 
904	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	pilots	 in	 controlling	 planes,	 which	 can	 result	 in	 crashes	 and	possibly	 causing	human	casualties.7	 In	 such	an	event,	 the	 law	of	armed	conflict	would	be	applied	as	the	nature	of	the	damage	has	turned	from	intangible	to	tangible.8	On	the	other	hand,	when	the	impact	of	 information	operations	is	 intangible	damage,	there	are	challenges	in	regulating	information	warfare	under	the	authority	of	international	law.9	Additionally,	the	right	to	freedom	of	opinion	and	expression,	the	 common	 heritage	 of	 mankind	 (“CHM”)	 principle,	 and	 the	provisions	 of	 the	 Outer	 Space	 Treaty	 create	 restrictions	 for	international	 law	 in	 regulating	 the	 operations	 of	 information	warfare.10	 These	 restrictions	 make	 it	 difficult	 to	 legally	 bring	information	warfare	within	the	regulation	of	the	norms,	rules,	and	principles	 of	 international	 law.11	 Consequently,	 information	operations	 become	 unrestricted	 in	 their	 scope	 and	 functioning,	which	 poses	 risks	 to	 international	 peace	 and	 security.	 	 This	 is	because	 a	 lack	 of	 regulation	 can	 make	 the	 use	 of	 information	warfare	strategies	uncontrolled,	 inviting	rival	states	 to	use	 them	against	each	other	unrestrictedly.12	The	risks	to	peace	and	security	deepen	 when	 information	 operations	 are	 installed	 by	 militant	terrorists	and	anti-state	actors.13	Therefore,	it	is	essential	that	the	international	community	unites	 to	 legislate	new	rules	regulating	the	conduct	of	states	and	nonstate	actors	whenever	they	use	the	strategies	 and	 tools	 of	 information	warfare	 against	 any	 state	 or	entity.	The	underlying	challenges	in	doing	so	can	be	met	through	arranging	 a	 new	 convention	 on	 the	 issue	 and	 holding	 dialogues	
 
7.	 E.g.,	Michael	J.	Robbat,	Resolving	the	Legal	Issues	Concerning	the	use	of	Information	
Warfare	 in	the	International	Forum:	The	Reach	of	the	Existing	Legal	Framework,	and	the	
Creation	of	a	New	Paradigm,	6	B.	U.	J.	SCI	&	TECH.	L.	26	(2000).		8.	 Id.	at	13.	9.	 See,	e.g.,	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	See	also	Phillip	A.	Johnson,	Is	it	Time	
for	a	Treaty	on	 Information	Warfare?,	 in	COMPUTER	NETWORK	ATTACK	AND	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	439	(Michael	N.	Schmitt	&	Brian	T.	O’Donnell	eds.,	2010).		10.	 Id.	11.	 Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	445-46.	12.	 Nitu,	supra	note	6,	at	200-01.	13.	 M.A.	 Hannan	 Bin	 Azhar	 &	 Thomas	 Edward	 Allen	 Barton,	 Forensic	 Analysis	 of	
Secure	Ephemeral	Messaging	Applications	on	Android	Platforms,	in	GLOBAL	SECURITY,	SAFETY	AND	 SUSTAINABILITY:	 THE	 SECURITY	 CHALLENGES	 OF	 THE	 CONNECTED	 WORLD	 27	 (Hamid	Jahankhani	et	al.	eds.,	2017).	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 905	among	states	to	control	the	unrestricted	arena	of	the	information	operations.14	This	 Article	 will	 include	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 different	operations	 of	 information	 warfare.	 It	 will	 also	 include	 an	explanation	of	how	challenging	it	has	become	for	international	law	to	regulate	information	operations.	After	a	brief	introduction	to	the	whole	 Article	 in	 the	 Part	 I,	 Part	 II	 will	 include	 the	 definition	 of	information	 warfare	 and	 information	 operations.	 Part	 III	 will	highlight	some	of	the	major	information	operations	and	strategies	of	 information	warriors	that	are	being	carried	out	 in	the	current	era.	Part	IV	will	discuss	how	significantly	the	arena	of	information	warfare	has	revolutionized	the	concept	of	warfare	in	the	current	era	 and	 how	 substantially	 the	 information	 operations	 are	augmenting	the	lethality	of	hybrid	warfare.	Part	V	will	include	an	evaluation	 of	 the	 key	 challenges	 that	 are	 being	 faced	 by	international	 law,	 especially	 by	 the	 international	 law	 of	 armed	conflict,	 in	 regulating	 information	 warfare.	 Finally,	 Part	 VI	 will	include	 some	 suggestions	 for	 regulating	 information	 operations,	primarily	by	bringing	the	sphere	of	information	warfare	under	the	broad	umbrella	of	 international	 law.	 Inferences	will	be	drawn	at	the	end	of	the	Article.	
II.	WHAT	IS	INFORMATION	WARFARE?	Information	warfare	is	a	set	of	contemporary	tactics	adopted	by	 states	 as	 well	 as	 nonstate	 actors	 to	 achieve	 competitive	advantage	over	their	adversaries.15	These	tactics	can	be	deployed	with	or	without	the	use	of	force.16	Generally,	information	warfare	causes	 intangible	 damage	 to	 the	 adversary	 by	 deteriorating	 its	reputation	 through	 propaganda,	 disinformation,	 or	 “fake	 news,”	which	 is	 carried	out	 via	 the	use	of	mass	media,	 social	media,	 or	similar.17	However,	when	the	software	intrusion	methods	are	used	
 14.	 See	generally	Johnson,	supra	note	9.	15.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1.	16.	 Markku	Jokisipila,	E-Jihad,	Cyberterrorism	and	Freedom	of	Speech,	in	WAR,	VIRTUAL	WAR	AND	SOCIETY:	THE	CHALLENGE	TO	COMMUNITIES	94	(Andrew	R.	Wilson	&	Mark	L.	Perry	eds.,	2008).	17.	 See	Nitu,	supra	note	6,	at	204.	See	also	Anna-Marie	Jansen	van	Vuuren	et	al.,	The	
Susceptibility	of	the	South	African	Media	to	Be	Used	as	a	Tool	for	Information	Warfare,	in	
 
906	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	to	 cause	 damage	 to	 the	 strategically	 or	 economically	 important	computer	 data	 systems	 of	 an	 adversary,	 then	 that	 intangible	damage	 from	 information	 warfare	 can	 sometimes	 also	 produce	tangible	 damage	 to	 the	 adversary.18	 This	 happens	 in	 particular	when	the	military	command	and	control	systems	of	an	adversary	are	 attacked	 with	 malware	 or	 viruses.19	 If	 such	 an	 attack	 is	launched	on	weaponry	systems	such	as	computer	control	systems	of	fighter	jets	or	other	expensive	military	tools,	then	the	damage	can	 be	 tangible	 and	 produce	 heavy	 financial	 losses.20	 Human	casualties	 can	 also	 result	 if	 weapon	 systems	 become	 out	 of	control—e.g.,	the	crashing	of	jet	planes.21	The	 emergence	 of	 information	 warfare	 operations	 can	 be	ascribed	to	advancements	in	technology,	as	most	of	the	dangerous	information	 warfare	 tactics	 include	 the	 use	 of	 advanced	technological	 tools.	For	 instance,	 the	spread	of	malware,	viruses,	etc.	 requires	 modern	 computer	 hacking	 technologies.22	 Thus,	technology	 is	 used	 or	 misused	 against	 an	 adversary	 with	 the	intention	of	either	causing	intangible	damage	to	the	adversary	or	gaining	competitive	or	strategic	advantage	over	it.23	
A.	Definition	of	Information	Warfare	There	 is	no	unanimously	accepted	definition	of	 information	warfare	 so	 far.	Nonetheless,	 the	definitions	presented	by	 the	US	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	and	the	US	Air	Force	are,	to	some	extent,	famous	in	the	scholarly	world.24	The	former	regards	information	warfare	as	 “information	 operations”	 and	 defines	 it	 as	 “the	 integrated	employment	of	electronic	warfare,	computer	network	operations,	
 PROCEEDINGS	 OF	 THE	 11TH	 EUROPEAN	 CONFERENCE	 ON	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 AND	 SECURITY	127	(Robert	Erra	ed.,	2012).		18.	 Robbat,	supra	note	7,	at	8–13.	19.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1–2.	20.	 Robbat,	supra	note	7,	at	8–13.	21.	 Id.	22.	 DR.	 YANA	 KOROBKO	&	MAHMOUD	MUSA,	 THE	 SHIFTING	 GLOBAL	 BALANCE	 OF	 POWER:	PERILS	OF	A	WORLD	WAR	AND	PREVENTIVE	MEASURES	105	(2014).	23.	 See	 generally	 ROGER	 DEAN	 THRASHER,	 INFORMATION	 WARFARE:	 IMPLICATIONS	 FOR	FORGING	THE	TOOLS	(1996).		See	also	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1.	24.	 See	 details	 provided	 in	 the	 text	 under	 the	 footnote	 5	 in	 Christopher	 Joyner	&	Catherine	Lotrionte,	 Information	Warfare	as	 International	Coercion:	Elements	of	a	Legal	
Framework,	827	EUR.	J.	INT’L	L.	825-65	(2001).	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 907	psychological	 operations,	 military	 deception,	 and	 operations	security,	 in	 concert	 with	 specified	 supporting	 and	 related	capabilities,	 to	 influence,	 disrupt,	 corrupt	 or	 usurp	 adversarial	human	 and	 automated	 decision	 making	 while	 protecting	 our	own.”25	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 US	 Air	 Force	 has	 defined	information	warfare	 as	 “any	 action	 to	 deny,	 exploit,	 corrupt,	 or	destroy	 the	 enemy’s	 information	 and	 its	 functions;	 protecting	ourselves	against	 those	actions;	and	exploiting	our	own	military	information	functions.”26	These	definitions	suggest	that	information	warfare	is	a	set	of	techniques	 that	 employ	 information	 to	 achieve	 strategic	 or	competitive	advantage	over	an	adversary.	Additionally,	the	above	provided	 definitions	 also	 suggest	 that	 gaining	 such	 competitive	advantage	 also	 requires	 ensuring	 adequate	 security	 from	 the	information	 operations	 of	 the	 adversary.27	 Hence,	 the	strengthening	of	security	systems	would	play	an	essential	role	in	the	 quest	 to	 gain	 advantage	 over	 an	 adversary	 in	 the	 arena	 of	information	warfare.	
B.	Difference	Between	Information	Warfare	and	Cyberwarfare	Although	 there	 are	 some	 similarities	 between	 information	warfare	 and	 cyberwarfare,	 the	 scopes	 of	 the	 two	 fields	 are	significantly	 different.	 Information	 warfare	 is	 an	 older	phenomenon	than	cyberwarfare	and	has	been	a	fundamental	part	of	 conventional	 war	 throughout	 the	 course	 of	 history.28	 On	 the	other	hand,	cyberwarfare	is	a	relatively	new	phenomenon,	because	it	 has	 emerged	 only	 since	 the	 invention	 of	 the	 internet	 and	computers,	 unlike	 a	 number	 of	 information	warfare	 operations,	which	existed	long	before.29	
 25.	 For	details,	see	U.S.	DEPARTMENT	OF	DEFENSE,	THE	DICTIONARY	OF	MILITARY	TERMS	261	(2009).	See	also	MARCO	BOSCINI	&	LEVERHULME	TRUST,	CYBER	OPERATIONS	AND	THE	USE	OF	FORCE	IN	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	11	(2014).	26.	 ATHINA	KARATZOGIANNI,	THE	POLITICS	OF	CYBERCONFLICT	100	(2006).	27.	 Id.	28.	 David	R.	Mets,	AIRPOWER	AND	TECHNOLOGY:	SMART	AND	UNMANNED	WEAPONS:	SMART	AND	UNMANNED	WEAPONS	139	(2008).	29.	 Ryan	White	et	al.,	The	Difference	Between	Cyber	and	Information	Warfare,	CYBER	SECURITY	&	L.	POL’Y	(Feb.	20,	2018),	https://blog.cybersecuritylaw.us/2018/02/20/the-difference-between-cyber-and-information-warfare	[https://perma.cc/3CDP-J6AY].		
 
908	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	Primarily,	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 information	 operations,	 it	 is	information	that	is	used	as	a	weapon	against	an	adversary.30	In	this	regard,	the	US	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	have	recognized	three	distinct	elements	of	the	information	operations:	these	include	the	physical,	cognitive,	 and	 informational	 arenas.31	 The	 list	 of	 endeavors	 that	can	be	 carried	out	 in	 the	 sphere	of	 information	warfare	 is	quite	extensive	and	includes	disseminating	propaganda,	“fake	news,”	or	disinformation	through	media	and	social	media.32		It	also	includes	spreading	 malware	 and	 viruses	 and	 making	 denial-of-service	(“DDoS”)	attacks	on	the	military	command	and	control	systems	of	an	 adversary.33	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 cyberwarfare	 only	 includes	reliance	on	internet	and	computers	as	a	means	of	gaining	strategic	competitive	advantage	over	an	adversary.34	Cyberwarfare	relies	on	DDoS	attacks,	computer	viruses,	hacking,	and	malware	attacks	on	an	adversary’s	strategically	important	computer	systems.35	Thus,	information	 warfare	 is	 a	 bigger	 umbrella,	 including	 print	 and	electronic	 media,	 computers,	 software,	 surveillance,	 and	espionage,	 while	 the	 scope	 of	 cyberwarfare	 is	 limited	 to	 the	internet	and	computers.36	Cyberwarfare	is	also	only	one	dimension	or	discipline	in	the	multidimensional	field	of	information	warfare;	however,	 owing	 to	 the	 worldwide	 emergence	 of	 technological	revolution,	 cyberwarfare	 in	 the	 broad	 spectrum	 of	 information	warfare	 is	 crucially	 important	 and,	 therefore,	 cannot	 be	neglected.37	
 30.	 Rex	 Mbuthia,	 Cyber	 Warfare	 Versus	 Information	 Warfare:	 Two	 Very	 Different	
Concepts,	 LINKEDIN	 (July	 16,	 2017,)	 https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cyber-warfare-versus-information-two-very-different-concepts-mbuthia	 [https://perma.cc/4QFJ-YZ2W].	
31.	 See	 ISAAC	 PORCHE	 ET	 AL.,	 REDEFINING	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 BOUNDARIES	 FOR	 AN	ARMY	IN	A	WIRELESS	WORLD	12	(2013).	32.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1–2.	33.	 See	id.	34.	 See	 STEVE	 WINTERFELD	 &	 JASON	 ANDRESS,	 THE	 BASICS	 OF	 CYBER	 WARFARE:	UNDERSTANDING	THE	FUNDAMENTALS	OF	CYBER	WARFARE	IN	THEORY	AND	PRACTICE	16	(2012).	35.	 See	White	et	al.,	supra	note	29.	36.	 Id.	37.	 Id.	
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III.	SOME	MAJOR	TACTICS	OF	INFORMATION	WARFARE	Information	 warfare	 is a complicated arena which relies on 
numerous tactics that are employed against an adversary.38 It is 
pertinent to mention here that the tactics of information warfare are also 
being adopted in waging hybrid warfare.39 Thus the similarity of the 
tactics of information warfare and hybrid warfare indicates toward a 
close mutual relationship that exists between these two arenas of 
unconventional warfare.40	 The	 most	 common	 of	 these	 tactics	 are	elucidated	below.	
A.	Use	of	Media	According	 to	 Aki-Mauri	 Huhtinen,	 information	 warfare	always	 entails	 certain	objectives	 aimed	at	 an	 adversary.41	These	objectives	 primarily	 include	 waging	 propaganda	 and	disinformation	 against	 a	 rival.42	 For	 this	 purpose,	 manipulated	information	is	disseminated	against	an	adversary	through	certain	mediums,	among	which	mainstream	media	appears	the	greatest.43	A	certain	kind	of	perception	is	crafted	of	the	adversary,	which	is	realized	through	the	use	of	print	and	electronic	media	sources.44	1.	Psychological	Warfare	The	media	is	also	regarded	as	a	tool	of	psychological	warfare,	because	the	narrative	among	the	people—shaped	by	the	media—fundamentally	 affects	 their	 psychological	 comprehension	 of	 a	particular	 situation.45	 Primarily,	 it	 is	 the	 media	 that	 shapes	people’s	 opinions	 about	 any	 incident,	 activity,	 or	 situation.	 The	media	 can	 also	 incite	 the	 sentiments	 of	 the	 public	 by	 spreading	hatred-oriented	 information	 among	 them	 about	 a	 particular	
 38.	 See,	e.g.,	Furgacz,	supra	note	3,	at	207.	39.	 Id.	at	215.	40.	 Id.	41.	 For	details,	 see	Aki-Mauri	Huhtinen,	Different	Types	of	 Information	Warfare,	 in	ELECTRONIC	 GOVERNMENT:	 CONCEPTS,	 METHODOLOGIES,	 TOOLS,	 AND	 APPLICATIONS:	 CONCEPTS,	METHODOLOGIES,	TOOLS,	AND	APPLICATIONS	291	(Anttiroiko	Ari-Veikko	ed.,	2008).	42.	 See	GREENBERG	et	al.,	supra	note	1,	at	1.	43.	 See	Vuuren	et	al.,	supra	note	17.	44.	 Id.	45.	 See,	 e.g.,	 WAEL	 ABDELAL,	 HAMAS	 AND	 THE	MEDIA:	 POLITICS	 AND	 STRATEGY	 145-46	(2016).		
 
910	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	activity	or	situation.46	For	example,	the	media	can	incite	patriotic	sentiments	 among	 people	 by	 spreading	 hatred-oriented	disinformation	about	a	competitor	nation.47	The	masses	may	start	to	believe	the	disinformation,	particularly	when	the	majority	of	the	people	have	no	direct	access	to	the	correct	information	about	that	particular	 adversary.	 Such	 incidents	 are	 observed	 in	 totalitarian	states,	where	the	government	has	full	control	over	the	media	and	allows	 the	display	of	 only	manipulated	 content	 and	news	on	TV	channels.48	2.	The	Application	of	the	Framing	Theory:	Relationship	Between	Media	and	Foreign	Policy	The	 use	 of	 media	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 information	 warfare	 is	 also	regarded	 as	 soft	 part	 of	 information	 warfare.49	 To	 explain	 this	further,	 the	 “framing	 theory”	 becomes	 applicable.50	 That	 is,	 the	media	 frames	 a	 particular	 activity	 or	 entity	 of	 having	 certain	attributions	and	promotes	its	manipulated	interpretations	of	that	activity.51	Such	framing	can	either	demonize	or	glorify	that	entity	depending	upon	the	negative	or	positive	framing	of	that	entity	by	media,	respectively.52	Often,	 the	 framing	 theory	 becomes	 relevant	 in	 shaping	 the	determinants	of	nations’	foreign	policy,	in	which	adversary	states	are	regarded	as	evil	and	negative,	while	friendly	states	are	given	a	positive	reputation.	This	is	constructed	with	or	without	the	use	of	proper	 factual	 information.53	 The	 foreign	 policy	 of	 the	 state	 is	shaped	 by	 various	 factors,	 such	 as	 the	 geopolitics	 of	 the	 state,	
 46.	 For	example,	media	can	incite	patriotic	sentiments	among	the	public.	For	details,	see	LYN	GORMAN	&	DAVID	MCLEAN,	MEDIA	AND	SOCIETY	INTO	THE	21ST	CENTURY:	A	HISTORICAL	INTRODUCTION	82	(2d	ed.	2009).	47.	 Id.	48.	 See,	e.g.,	id.	49.	 For	details,	see	Huhtinen,	supra	note	41,	at	292.	50.	 To	 understand	 the	 framing	 theory,	 see	 Ingrid	 Volkmer,	 Framing	 Theory,	 in	 1	ENCYCLOPEDIA	OF	COMMUNICATION	THEORY	408	(Stephen	W.	Littlejohn	&	Karen	A.	Foss	eds.,	2009).	51.	 Ashli	Quesinberry	Stokes,	Clinton,	Post-Feminism,	and	Rhetorical	Reception	on	the	
Campaign	Trail,	 in	 THE	2008	PRESIDENTIAL	CAMPAIGN:	A	COMMUNICATION	PERSPECTIVE	133	(Robert	E.	Denton,	Jr.	ed.,	2009).	52.	 Id.	53.	 INGA	VON	DER	STEIN,	THE	MEDIA	AS	AN	INSTRUMENT	OF	INFORMATION	WARFARE	(2016),	
available	at	https://www.grin.com/document/337247	[https://perma.cc/VN6S-2RSV].	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 911	which,	 of	 course,	 are	 obviously	 accounted	 by	 the	 media	 in	spreading	 any	 narrative	 about	 any	 aspect	 or	 issue.54	 However,	foreign	 policy	 and	 the	 media’s	 narratives	 are	 significantly	influenced	by	“the	political	and	economic	systems	of	the	state.”55	This	 is	 evident	 from	 the	Cold	War	 era,	 especially	 during	Ronald	Reagan’s	reign	in	power,	when	the	US	media	vehemently	opposed	the	socialist	and	communist	agendas	of	the	Soviet	Union.56	In	that	era,	 rigorous	 media	 campaigns	 demonizing	 communist	 theories	were	 launched	 by	 the	 US	 mass	 media.57	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 US	governmental	agencies,	especially	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency	(“CIA”),	 also	 supported	 antisocialist	 narratives.58	 Both	 the	 US	media	 and	 the	 government’s	 foreign	 policy	 were	 “framing”	 the	Soviet	Union	and	 its	communist	agenda	as	a	 threat	 to	 the	entire	world.59	In	fact,	the	threat	did	not	loom	over	the	entire	world	but	only	 over	 the	 capitalist	 system	 prevalent	 in	 the	 United	 States	during	the	Cold	War	era,	and	the	democratic	political	system	of	the	United	States	could	not	afford	any	kind	of	demise	of	the	capitalist	system.60	 Thus,	 for	 the	 strength	 and	 dominance	 of	 its	 capitalist	system	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union’s	 communism	 and	socialism,	 the	 US	 government	 relied	 on	 its	 media	 to	 launch	information	 warfare	 against	 the	 Soviet’s	 communism.	Concomitantly,	the	US	media	relied	on	the	information	available	to	it,	as	 interpreted	 in	accordance	with	US	 foreign	policy	regarding	the	 threats	posed	by	 socialism	and	 communism	 to	 the	 capitalist	economic	and	democratic	political	 system	of	 the	United	States.61	Consequently,	 the	 US	 media	 launched	 antisocialist	 and	anticommunist	propaganda	campaigns	against	the	Soviet	Union.62	Thus,	 the	 framing	of	 a	particular	 issue	 in	 the	 foreign	policy	of	 a	state	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 information	 disseminated	 by	 the	media	
 54.	 Id.	55.	 Id.	56.	 NANCY	BERNHARD,	U.S.	TELEVISION	NEWS	AND	COLD	WAR	PROPAGANDA,	1947–1960,	43-45	(2003).	57.	 Id.	58.	 Id.	See	also	GORMAN	&	MCLEAN,	supra	note	46,	at	133,	59.	 See	GORMAN	&	MCLEAN,	supra	note	46,	at	133.	60.	 See	 JAMES	 R.	 ARNOLD	 &	 ROBERTA	WIENER,	 COLD	WAR:	 THE	 ESSENTIAL	 REFERENCE	GUIDE,	XIII	(2012).	See	also	SAM	AARONOVITCH	&	RON	SMITH,	THE	POLITICAL	ECONOMY	OF	BRITISH	CAPITALISM:	A	MARXIST	ANALYSIS	143	(1981).	61.	 For	example,	as	described	by	GORMAN	&	MCLEAN,	supra	note	46,	at	133.	62.	 Id.	
 
912	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	about	that	issue.63	Furthermore,	by	relying	on	such	media	agencies,	it	 becomes	 quite	 convenient	 for	 a	 state	 to	 launch	 information	warfare	via	disinformation	and	propaganda	against	its	adversary.	
B.	Reliance	on	Social	Media	Platforms	In	the	contemporary	era,	owing	to	the	rise	of	technology	and	the	 consequent	 emergence	 of	 smartphones	 and	 the	 use	 of	 the	internet,	social	media	has	appeared	as	one	of	the	most	prominent	sources	 of	 the	 dissemination	 of	 information.64	 An	 estimated	 3.5	billion	people,	or	nearly	half	of	the	human	population,	use	social	media.65	In	particular,	Facebook	has	2.4	billion	users,	YouTube	has	1.9	 billion,	 and	WhatsApp,	 owned	 by	 Facebook,	 has	 1.6	 billion.	These	 are	 the	 most	 commonly	 used	 social	 media	 platforms.66	These	forums	are	the	quickest	modes	of	information	dissemination	as	they	allow	any	information	to	go	viral	within	only	a	few	hours.67	Furthermore,	there	are	no	significant	costs	associated	with	the	use	of	almost	all	of	the	social	media	platforms.68	Social	media	forums	are	 very	 convenient	 and	 simple	 to	 use,	 and	 do	 not	 require	 any	proper	 identity	 verification	 of	 the	 individuals	 who	 make	 the	information	go	viral.69	Furthermore,	the	information	disseminated	through	 social	 media	 platforms	 keeps	 on	 reaching	 a	 larger	audience.	That	is,	the	information	can	be	shared	on	and	on	and	thus	creates	a	multiplier	effect	in	terms	of	the	number	of	people	it	can	reach.70	 Therefore,	 social	 media	 is	 considered	 a	 quick	 way	 of	
 63.	 See	STEIN,	supra	note	53.	64.	 Eda	 Turanci,	 Consumption	 in	 the	 Digital	 Age:	 A	 Research	 on	 Social	 Media	
Influencers,	in	HANDBOOK	OF	RESEARCH	ON	CONSUMPTION,	MEDIA,	AND	POPULAR	CULTURE	IN	THE	GLOBAL	AGE	269	(Ozlen	Ozgen	ed.,	2019).	65.	 See	Simon	Kemp,	Digital	2019:	Q2	Global	Digital	Statshot,	DIGITALPORTAL	(Apr.	25,	 2019),	 https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-q2-global-digital-statshot	[https://perma.cc/3GEG-TXMW].	66.	 Id.	67.	 See	 Jethro	 Tan	 et	 al.,	Building	 National	 Resilience	 in	 the	 Digital	 Era	 of	 Violent	
Extremism:	Systems	and	People,	in	COMBATING	VIOLENT	EXTREMISM	AND	RADICALIZATION	IN	THE	DIGITAL	ERA	316	(Majeed	Khader	et	al.	eds.,	2016).	68.	 See	JASON	FALLS	&	ERIK	DECKERS,	NO	BULLSHIT	SOCIAL	MEDIA:	THE	ALL-BUSINESS,	NO-HYPE	GUIDE	TO	SOCIAL	MEDIA	MARKETING	233	(2011).	69.	 Id.	Read	about	 fake	 identities	on	social	media	as	described	by	R.J.	PARKER	&	J.J.	SLATE,	SOCIAL	MEDIA	MONSTERS:	INTERNET	KILLERS	185	(2014).	70.	 Automated	bot	software	is	also	used	for	this	purpose.	To	read	more	about	bots,	see	 Stefano	 De	 Paoli,	 A	 Comparison	 and	 a	 Framework	 for	 Investigating	 Bots	 in	 Social	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 913	disseminating	information	to	a	large	number	of	audiences.71	It	 is	regarded	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 essential	 tools	 of	 information	warfare.72	Additionally,	 another	 feature	 is	 paid	 campaigns	 on	 certain	social	 media	 websites	 such	 as	 Facebook,	 which	 facilitates	 paid	promotion	 of	 the	 content	 shared	 on	 Facebook.73	 This	 feature	makes	the	shared	content	visible	to	a	higher	number	of	Facebook	users.74	 The	 price	 to	 be	 paid	 for	 such	 social	 media	 campaigns	promoting	particular	content	is	too	small.75	As	campaigns	make	the	content	 reach	 a	 larger	 audience,76	 they	 are	 used	 by	 information	warriors	 to	 wage	 informational	 attacks	 on	 their	 adversaries.77	These	 informational	 attacks	 mainly	 include	 the	 spread	 of	disinformation	 and	 propaganda	 on	 social	 media	 against	 an	adversary.78	 If	 propaganda	 or	 disinformation	 is	 spread	 so	 as	 to	incite	 or	 challenge	 the	 religious	 or	 ideological	 inclinations	 of	 a	nation,	then	such	propaganda	can	urge	them	to	protest	against	the	individuals	sharing	propaganda	on	social	media.	The	resharing	of	content	on	social	media	may	further	aggravate	their	emotions	and	make	 the	 information	 go	 viral,	 reaching	 more	 people	 and	 thus	inviting	 stronger	 reactions.	 Such	 utilization	 of	 social	 media	 can	prove	to	be	detrimental	for	peace	when	it	is	employed	by	anti-state	actors	 to	 spread	 propaganda	 against	 the	 state.79	 Herein,	 social	media	 appears	 a	 negative	 and	 lethal	 component	 of	 information	warfare	 as	 it	 allows	 any	 information	 to	 go	 viral,	 demonize	 the	
 
Networks	Sites	and	MMOGs,	in	HANDBOOK	ON	3D3C	PLATFORMS:	APPLICATIONS	AND	TOOLS	FOR	THREE	DIMENSIONAL	SYSTEMS	FOR	COMMUNITY,	CREATION	AND	COMMERCE	60	(Yesha	Sivan	ed.,	2015).	71.	 JAY	LEVINSON,	GUERRILLA	SOCIAL	MEDIA	MARKETING:	100+	WEAPONS	TO	GROW	YOUR	ONLINE	INFLUENCE,	ATTRACT	CUSTOMERS,	AND	DRIVE	PROFITS	xii	(2010).	72.	 See	Vuuren	et	al.,	supra	note	17.	73.	 For	details,	see	KRIS	OLIN,	FACEBOOK	ADVERTISING	GUIDE	36	(2009).	74.	 Id.	75.	 Id.	76.	 Id.	77.	 See	Vuuren	et	al.,	supra	note	17.	78.	 TOBY	MATTHIESEN,	 SECTARIAN	GULF:	BAHRAIN,	SAUDI	ARABIA,	AND	THE	ARAB	SPRING	THAT	WASN’T	33	(2013).	79.	 SIMON	 HARDING,	 GLOBAL	 PERSPECTIVES	 ON	 YOUTH	 GANG	 BEHAVIOR,	 VIOLENCE,	 AND	WEAPONS	USE	117	(2016).	
 
914	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	reputation	 of	 an	 adversary	 within	 a	 short	 passage	 of	 time,	 and	incite	the	emotions	of	the	general	public	into	uproar	and	tumult.80	
C.	Intrusion	of	Cyberspace	The	intrusion	of	cyberspace	is	another	tactical	move	regarded	as	an	element	of	information	warfare.81	The	practice	of	intruding	on	 cyberspace	 is	 dependent	 on	 technology.	 The	 intrusion	 of	cyberspace	is	when	the	strategically	important	computer	systems	of	an	adversary	are	attacked	with	viruses	or	malware	via	hacking.82	Many	examples	of	 such	 incidents	 can	be	 found	 in	 recent	history	and	 are	 continuing	 today.	 For	 instance,	 according	 to	 the	 US	Department	of	Defense,	the	Pentagon	has	to	foil	around	36	million	email	 breaches	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	 to	 secure	 their	 computer	networking	 systems	 from	 hackers.83	 This	 highlights	 the	 serious	nature	of	the	threats	posed	by	technology	to	the	security	systems	of	a	state.84	Therefore,	every	state	tries	to	maintain	strict	security	over	its	strategically	important	data	systems.	
D.	Data	Theft	Data	theft	is	also	one	of	the	prominent	tactics	of	information	warriors.85	This	 tactic	 is	motivated	by	the	goal	of	either	thieving	confidential	 and	 strategically	 important	 information	 from	 an	adversary	or	stealing	funds	from	the	bank	accounts	of	a	rival.86	The	consequences	may	produce	intangible	damage	in	terms	of	stealing	strategically	 important	 information	 and	 may	 leave	 the	 affected	party	 at	 a	 strategic	 disadvantage	 compared	 to	 its	 rivals.87	Sometimes,	the	data	theft	is	politically	motivated	and	is	aimed	at	maneuvering	or	affecting	political	situations.	A	recent	example	of	
 80.	 Id.	81.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1.	82.	 Id.	83.	 Frank	 R.	 Konkel,	 Pentagon	 Thwarts	 36	 Million	 Email	 Breach	 Attempts	 Daily,	NEXTGOV.COM,	 (Jan.	 11,	 2018),	https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2018/01/pentagon-thwarts-36-million-email-breach-attempts-daily/145149	[https://perma.cc/63U6-6EPE].	84.	 Id.	85.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	2.	86.	 Id.	87.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	2.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 915	such	data	 theft	 is	 the	Cambridge	Analytica	scandal,	 in	which	 the	data	of	as	many	as	87,000	Facebook	users	was	accessed	by	one	of	the	board	members	of	 the	 firm	Cambridge	Analytica.88	This	data	was	used	for	the	presidential	election	campaign	of	Donald	Trump	in	 2016.89	 According	 to	 the	 investigation	 reports,	 the	 data	 was	accessed	 through	 an	 online	 software	 application	 created	 by	 an	independent	 researcher	 and	 lecturer	 at	 Cambridge	 University,	Alexandr	Kogan.90	The	name	of	the	application	was	“This	Is	Your	Digital	 Life”	 and	 it	was	basically	 a	personality	 test	 application.91	The	 app	 became	 famous	 among	 Facebook	 users	 and	 whoever	accessed	and	used	 the	app	 for	a	personality	 test	unintentionally	gave	his/her	entire	Facebook	data	and	 that	of	his/her	Facebook	friends	 to	 Kogan’s	 app;	 Kogan	 later	 shared	 this	 data	 with	Cambridge	 Analytica.92	 Primarily,	 the	 data	 was	 of	 US	 and	 UK	citizens.93	This	occurred	 in	2015,	when	Donald	Trump’s	political	team	was	busy	in	the	election	campaign,	and	one	of	the	members	of	Trump’s	political	team,	Steve	Bannon,	happened	to	be	a	member	of	the	board	of	Cambridge	Analytica.94	So,	he	used	Kogan’s	app	data	for	 Trump’s	 election	 campaign	 and,	 consequently,	 Trump’s	political	team	crafted	the	content	of	Trump’s	speeches	as	well	as	many	 other	 election	 campaigning	 endeavors	 and	 narratives	according	to	the	interests	and	likes	of	the	people	whose	data	was	
 88.	 See	Olivia	Solon,	Facebook	Says	Cambridge	Analytica	may	Have	Gained	37m	More	
Users’	 Data,	 GUARDIAN	 (Apr.	 4,	 2018),	https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/04/facebook-cambridge-analytica-user-data-latest-more-than-thought	[https://perma.cc/74YR-T8HG].		89.	 Ian	 Sherr,	Facebook,	 Cambridge	 Analytica	 and	Data	Mining:	What	 you	Need	 to	
Know,	 CNET	 18	 (Apr.	 18,	 2018),	 https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-cambridge-analytica-data-mining-and-trump-what-you-need-to-know/	 [https://perma.cc/35CC-N3BY].	90.	 Id.	91.	 Id.	92.	 See	how	Facebook	users	gave	their	data	to	Kogan’s	app	as	explained	in	Andrew	Wyrich,	What	Is	Cambridge	Analytica,	the	Data	Firm	Connected	to	the	Trump	Campaign?	R,	(Mar.	 19,	 2018)	 https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/what-is-cambridge-analytica	[https://perma.cc/E4LF-2QKY].	 See	 also	 how	 Kogan	 shared	 data	 with	 Cambridge	Analytica	as	explained	by	Solon,	supra	note	88.	93.	 See	Solon,	supra	note	88.	94.	 The	 Editorial	 Board,	Facebook	 Leaves	 Its	 Users’	 Privacy	 Vulnerable,	 N.Y.	 TIMES,	(Mar.	 19,	 2018).	 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/facebook-cambridge-analytica-privacy.html	[https://perma.cc/8GM6-HYZV].	
 
916	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	accessed.95	Hence,	the	attempt	to	affect	the	US	presidential	election	result	 was	 made	 through	 the	 theft	 of	 the	 personal	 data	 of	thousands	of	US	citizens	without	their	permission.96	It	was	speculated	that	Russia	might	have	supported	the	data	theft	and	assisted	Trump’s	political	team	to	access	the	stolen	data	via	Cambridge	Analytica	 to	pave	the	way	 for	Trump’s	win	 in	 the	presidential	 election.97	 Although	 the	 investigations	 were	 also	made,	no	conclusive	evidence	could	be	traced	of	the	Russian	state’s	involvement.98	 Nonetheless,	 the	 mere	 speculation	 of	 such	interventions	 raised	 alarm	 bells.	 The	 likelihood	 of	 such	interventions	in	the	future	as	part	of	Russia’s	information	warfare	strategy	could	not	be	neglected.99	Therefore,	 it	 increased	calls	to	regulate	 social	 media	 forums,	 software	 applications,	 and	 other	tools	of	information	warfare	to	prevent	data	theft	and	cyberattacks	from	making	political	disruptions	 in	 the	 future.100	Consequently,	the	 Honest	 Ads	 Act	 became	 more	 strictly	 enforced	 all	 over	 the	United	States.101	This	law	makes	it	mandatory	for	all	social	media	and	 software	 companies	 to	 share	 their	 policies	 and	 procedures	with	 the	 US	 State	 Department	 regarding	 running	 any	 kind	 of	application	that	could	access	individuals’	data	and	could	be	used	for	political	purposes.102	Any	application	that	may	appear	to	have	the	 potential	 to	 be	 used	 for	 political	 purposes,	 especially	 any	linkages	 with	 foreign	 political	 powers,	 might	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	operate	in	the	United	States.103	Thus,	through	implementing	such	legal	 enactments,	 the	 US	 governmental	 agencies	 are	 trying	 to	counter	 the	 threats	 of	 information	warfare	 that	 loom	over	 their	
 95.	 See	Sherr,	supra	note	89.	96.	 Id.	97.	 Id.	 See	 Sherr,	 supra	 note	 89;	 see	 also	 Donna	 Brazile,	 Russia’s	 Interference	
Spotlights	Weaknesses	in	US	Election	Process,	in	INTERFERENCE	IN	ELECTIONS	75	(Kristina	Lyn	Heitkamp	ed.,	2018).	98.	 For	details,	see	the	conclusive	paragraphs	of	the	article	by	Sean	Illing,	Cambridge	
Analytica,	 the	 Shady	Data	Firm	That	Might	 be	 a	 key	Trump-Russia	 Link,	 Explained,	 VOX,	(Apr.	 4,	 2018),	 https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/16/15657512/cambridge-analytica-facebook-alexander-nix-christopher-wylie	[https://perma.cc/D5MA-5PDG].	99.	 See	id.	100.	 See	Brazile,	supra	note	97.	101.	 Id.	102.	 See	Sherr,	supra	note	89.	103.	 See	Brazile,	supra	note	97,	at	75.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 917	political	and	security	infrastructures.104	As	Cambridge	Analytica’s	cofounder—Christopher	 Wylie—said	 himself	 regarding	 the	threats	of	information	warfare	in	response	to	the	recent	data	theft	by	 one	 of	 the	 board	 members	 of	 the	 firm	 causing	 a	 data-theft	scandal,	“Rules	don’t	matter	for	them.	For	them,	this	is	a	war,	and	it’s	all	fair.	They	want	to	fight	a	culture	war	in	America.	Cambridge	Analytica	was	supposed	to	be	the	arsenal	of	weapons	to	fight	that	culture	war.”105	
E.	Rhetoric	Building	of	the	Masses	of	the	Adversary	State	Information	warfare	often	 involves	 the	essential	purpose	of	shaping	the	narratives	of	the	masses.106	This	is	done	by	spreading	manipulated	 information	 to	 them.107	 A	 state	 or	 its	 agencies	 can	perform	this	function	with	or	without	using	the	services	of	media.	For	example,	within	the	territorial	boundaries	of	a	state,	the	media	may	 be	 used	 for	 this	 purpose.108	 However,	 when	 a	 state	 or	 its	agencies	aim	to	construct	a	particular	narrative	of	the	people	of	its	adversary	state,	they	may	resort	to	other	covert	or	overt	activities;	for	 instance,	 they	can	send	their	agents	 into	 the	adversary	state,	disguising	 their	 identities	 and	 spreading	 particular	 narratives	among	 the	 general	 public.109	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 some	 other	initiatives—such	 as	 establishing	nongovernmental	 organizations	(“NGOs”)	in	the	adversary	state—can	also	work	as	tools	for	waging	information	operations.	Such	NGOs	may	outwardly	present	 their	identities	 as	 trustworthy	 organizations	 working	 for	 the	development	 of	 local	 people,	 but,	 underhandedly,	 they	 may	 be	working	 to	 spread	 a	 particular	 anti-state	 narrative	 among	 the	masses	by	simply	approaching	them.110	
 104.	 For	example,	see	how	the	Pentagon	is	averting	hacking	threats	as	mentioned	by	Konkel,	supra	note	83.	105.	 See	Wyrich,	supra	note	92.	106.	 ARMIN	KRISHNAN,	WHY	PARAMILITARY	OPERATIONS	FAIL	237	(2018).	107.	 Id.	108.	 See	Abdelal,	supra	note	45.	See	also	Huhtinen,	supra	note	41,	at	292.	109.	 See	GEOFFREY	SMITH,	ROYALIST	AGENTS,	CONSPIRATORS	AND	SPIES:	THEIR	ROLE	IN	THE	BRITISH	CIVIL	WARS,	1640–1660	8-9	(2013).	110.	 For	example,	some	NGOs	were	banned	by	the	Interior	Ministry	of	Pakistan	as	they	were	found	to	be	involved	in	antistate	activities.	For	details,	see	Irfan	Haider,	Pakistan	
Will	 Not	 Allow	 NGOs	Working	Against	 National	 Interest:	 Nisar,	 DAWN	 (June	 12,	 2015),	https://www.dawn.com/news/1187773	[https://perma.cc/G7RU-FDDW].	
 
918	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	A	 unique	 example	 of	 using	 information	 warfare	 to	 build	 a	public	 narrative	 of	 an	 adversary	 state	 was	 used	 by	 the	 United	States	in	Iraq	in	2003.111	The	intention	of	such	information	warfare	was	to	pave	favorable	conditions	for	its	use	of	force	in	Iraq,	so	as	to	minimize	resistance	from	Iraqi	forces	and	citizens.	A	few	months	before	the	United	States	attacked	Iraq,	the	United	States	published	manipulated	information	in	pamphlets	and	flyers	and	successfully	disseminated	them	to	Iraqi	citizens	and	key	army	officers.112	The	content	 of	 some	 pamphlets	 urged	 Iraqi	 military	 officers	 not	 to	destroy	 the	 oil	 wells	 in	 Iraq	 on	 the	 orders	 of	 the	 then	 Iraqi	president,	 Saddam	 Hussein.113	 The	 pamphlets	 presented	 the	narrative	that	the	oil	wells	were	the	property	of	the	Iraqi	citizens	and,	 therefore,	 they	must	 not	 be	 destroyed.114	 Furthermore,	 the	pamphlets	contended	that	the	United	States	would	protect	those	oil	wells	if	Saddam	Hussein	gave	orders	to	destroy	them	in	the	act	of	war.115	This	is	how	the	United	States	tried	to	deceive	the	Iraqi	people	and	the	international	community:	by	presenting	a	narrative	that	 the	United	States	was	working	 for	 the	 interests	of	 the	 Iraqi	citizens,	while	the	Saddam	Hussein’s	establishment	was	working	for	 its	 own	 interests.	 The	 US	 government	 presented	 the	 same	narrative	 to	US	 Citizens	 to	 gain	 support	 for	 the	 aimed	 attack	 in	Iraq.116	 Hence,	 through	 such	 dissemination	 of	 a	 manipulated	narrative,	the	United	States	invaded	Iraq	and	faced	no	significant	resistance	in	its	takeover	of	the	entire	Iraqi	territory.117	Ultimately,	the	US	Army	got	information	about	the	hideout	of	Saddam	Hussein,	who	was	 arrested	 by	 the	 US	military	 forces	 and	 taken	 to	 court,	where	a	trial	was	held	against	him	that	resulted	in	awarding	him	a	death	sentence.118	Thus,	the	information	warfare	launched	by	the	
 111.	 See	e.g.,	Maxie	C.	Thom,	Information	Warfare	Arms	Control:	Risks	and	Costs,	INSS	OCCASIONAL	 PAPER	 	 45-47	 (Mar.	 2006),	https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4d0e/22a368c6afb68a153d6fdb0411f129409c30.pdf?_ga=2.213952983.1307757924.1583038850-969704245.1580936833	[https://perma.cc/MG4Z-EJD7].	112.	 Id.	113.	 Id.	114.	 Id.	115.	 Id.	116.	 Id.	117.	 Id.	118.	 For	details,	see	PAUL	R.	BARTROP,	A	BIOGRAPHICAL	ENCYCLOPEDIA	OF	CONTEMPORARY	GENOCIDE:	PORTRAITS	OF	EVIL	AND	GOOD	136	(2012).	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 919	United	 States	months	before	 invading	 Iraq	proved	beneficial	 for	the	subsequent	use	of	force	by	the	United	States	in	Iraq.119	
F.	Information	Warfare	by	Terrorists	Sometimes,	terrorist	or	nonstate	actors	also	use	information	warfare	to	shape	a	particular	narrative	among	the	general	public	or	 among	 the	media	 agencies.120	 For	 example,	 the	 Taliban	 used	information	warfare	alongside	the	lawfare	strategy	against	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(“NATO”)	forces	in	Afghanistan	back	in	2007–08.121	The	Taliban	used	to	disguise	themselves	among	the	general	 public	 in	 Afghanistan.122	 Hence,	 when	 NATO	 forces	launched	 military	 operations	 or	 air	 strikes	 them,	 many	 such	operations	resulted	in	the	killing	of	innocent	civilians	residing	in	the	vicinity	of	 the	Taliban.123	Consequently,	 the	Taliban	used	the	lawfare	 strategy	 alongside	 information	 warfare	 against	 NATO	forces	 to	 present	 a	 demonized	 picture	 of	 the	 NATO	 attacks.124	Using	 lawfare,	 they	 invoked	 international	 humanitarian	 law	(“IHL”)	and	presented	a	narrative	 that	 the	NATO	 forces	violated	IHL	with	their	military	operations	and	air	strikes,	resulting	in	the	deaths	of	noncombatant	civilians.125	In	their	information	warfare,	they	 reached	 out	 to	 local	 and	 international	media	 agencies	 and	shared	 with	 them	 the	 pictures,	 videos,	 and	 locations	 of	 the	innocent	 civilian	 casualties	 resulting	 from	 the	 air	 strikes	 of	 the	NATO	 forces.126	 Consequently,	 the	 international	media	 agencies,	journalists,	 and	 human	 rights	 activists	 denounced	 the	NATO	 air	
 119.	 See	Thom,	supra	note	111,	at	46.	120.	 JANTJE	 SILOMON,	 SOFTWARE	 AS	 A	 WEAPON:	 FACTORS	 CONTRIBUTING	 TO	 THE	DEVELOPMENT	AND	PROLIFERATION	106-23	(2018).	121.	 Charles	J.	Dunlap,	Jr.,	Law	and	Military	Interventions:	Preserving	Humanitarian	Values	in	21st	Conflicts	5,	(Carr	Ctr.	for	Hum.	Rts.	Pol’y,	Working	Paper,	2001).	122.	 The	Encyclopedia	of	Middle	East	Wars:	The	United	States	 in	the	Persian	Gulf,	Afghanistan,	and	Iraq	Conflicts,	911	(Spencer	C.	Tucker	ed.,	2010).	123.	 Charles	 J.	Dunlap,	 Jr.,	Lawfare:	A	Decisive	Element	of	21st	Century	Conflicts,	54	JOINT	FORCE	QUARTERLY 34, 36	(2009).	124.	 Id.	125.	 Trevor	Michael	 Alfred	 Logan,	 International	 Law	 and	 the	 Use	 of	 Lawfare:	 An	Argument	for	the	U.S.	To	Adopt	a	Lawfare	Doctrine	8	(MO.	ST.	U.	Graduate	Thesis,	2017),	
available	 at	https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4156&context=theses	[https://perma.cc/GT2G-RPSM].	126.	 Dunlap,	Jr.,	supra	note	121,	at	36.	
 
920	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	strikes.127	NATO’s	official	spokesperson	responded	to	this	negative	portrayal	of	air	strikes	as	the	consequence	of	a	“strategic	battle”	by	the	 Taliban.128	 Ultimately,	 the	NATO	 forces	 started	 hesitating	 in	rigorously	conducting	military	operations	and	air-strikes	against	the	 Taliban	 leaders	 out	 of	 the	 apprehensions	 of	 civilian	casualties.129	 This	 hesitation	 developed	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	negative	 image	of	 the	NATO	air-strikes	construed	in	Afghanistan	and	also	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Taliban	leaders	started	residing	in	the	 civilian	 populous	 regions.130	 Hence,	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	NATO	 military	 operations	 in	 Afghanistan	 started	 to	 decline.131	Today,	as	per	official	claims	by	the	Afghan	government,	the	Taliban	controls	over	forty-five	percent	of	the	territory	of	Afghanistan,132	though	 unofficial	 claims	 assert	 that	 approximately	 sixty-one	percent	of	the	territory	is	now	controlled	by	the	Taliban	and	the	remaining	thirty-nine	percent	 is	under	 the	control	of	 the	Afghan	government.133	 Thus,	 information	 warfare	 by	 the	 Taliban	 has	deteriorated	the	effectiveness	of	the	antiterrorist	operations	of	the	NATO	and	US	forces	in	Afghanistan.	In	conclusion,	information	warfare	entails	the	shaping	of	the	narratives	 of	 the	 general	 public	 using	 certain	 tools	 and	 sources,	which	include	mass	media	agencies	including	print	and	electronic	media	 and	 social	 media	 platforms,	 software	 applications	 for	hacking	or	stealing	data,	and	other	tools	such	as	malware,	viruses,	DDoS	 attacks,	 etc.134	 Disinformation,	 propaganda,	 the	dissemination	 of	 manipulated	 information,	 spreading	 malware	into	 adversaries’	 important	 computer	 software	 systems,	 and	stealing	confidential	and	strategically	critical	datasets	are	some	of	the	 tactics	 of	 information	 warfare	 pursued	 by	 information	warriors.135	It	is	not	only	states	but	also	nonstate	actors,	including	
 127.	 RABBI	SIMON	ALTAF	HAKOHEN,	WORLD	WAR	III	-	SALVATION	OF	THE	JEWS	66	(2018).	128.	 Dunlap,	Jr.,	supra	note	121,	at	36.	129.	 Id.	130.	 Id.	131.	 Id.	132.	 See	Anwer	Iqbal,	US	Govt	Misleading	Americans	on	Afghanistan:	Report,	DAWN	(Sept.	 9,	 2018),	 https://www.dawn.com/news/1431814	 [https://perma.cc/PNM4-UHR2].	133.	 See	 Rod	 Nordland	 et	 al.,	 How	 the	 US	 Government	 Misleads	 the	 Public	 on	
Afghanistan,	N.Y.	TIMES,	September	8,	2018.	134.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1–2.	135.	 Id.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 921	terrorists	and	NGOs	that	employ	information	warfare	techniques	to	 either	 pressure	 or	 gain	 advantage	 over	 their	 adversaries.136	Unfortunately,	information	warfare	has	spread	significantly	and	is	also	 modernizing	 its	 facets	 in	 the	 contemporary	 era,	 which	 is	posing	a	challenge	to	the	international	legal	experts,	who	ponder	ways	to	regulate	such	warfare.137	
IV.	INFORMATION	WARFARE	REVOLUTIONIZING	WARFARE	IN	
THE	CONTEMPORARY	ERA	Due	 to	 the	 novel	 strategies	 adopted	 by	 the	 information	warfare,	 the	 hybrid	warfare	 has	 become	 even	more	 effective.138	This	effectiveness	is	also	influenced	by	the	fact	that	the	tactics	of	information	 warfare	 can	 also	 be	 adopted	 in	 hybrid	 warfare.139	Thus,	 whenever	 the	 information	 warfare	 is	 waged	 alongside	hybrid	warfare	or	alongside	the	conventional	warfare,	it	boosts	the	warfare	 strategy.	 This	 Part	 will	 elucidate	 the	 revolution	 that	information	warfare	has	brought	to	the	arena	of	war	in	the	modern	era.	
A.	Waging	War	Without	the	Conventional	Use	of	Force	The	prevalent	adoption	of	the	tactics	of	information	warfare	by	states	and	nonstate	actors	has	led	to	a	revolution	in	warfare	in	the	 contemporary	 era.140	 The	 key	 feature	 of	 this	 revolution	 in	warfare	 is	 that	 information	warfare	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 the	 use	 of	conventional	 military	 force	 and	 can	 cause	 significant	 intangible	damage	 to	 an	 adversary	 even	 without	 the	 use	 of	 force.141	 Such	intangible	damage	may	not	be	imposed	on	the	adversary	by	the	use	of	force.142	Furthermore,	the	intangible	damage	is	not	protected	by	the	 international	 law	of	armed	conflict	or	by	 IHL.143	 Information	
 136.	 Id.	137.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	453.	138.	 See	Furgacz,	supra	note	3,	at	207.	139.	 Id.	140.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	See	also	ADRIAN	R.	LEWIS,	THE	AMERICAN	CULTURE	 OF	 WAR:	 A	 HISTORY	 OF	 US	 MILITARY	 FORCE	 FROM	 WORLD	 WAR	 II	 TO	 OPERATION	ENDURING	FREEDOM	387	(2006).	141.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	142.	 Id.	143.	 Id.	
 
922	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	warfare	 relies	 on	 several	 other	 methods	 such	 as	 propaganda	through	 media,	 DDoS	 attacks,	 virus	 attacks,	 hacking,	 and	defamation	 through	 media	 or	 social	 media.144	 None	 of	 these	information	 operations	 require	 the	 use	 of	 conventional	military	force.	In	particular,	when	the	military	command	and	control	system	of	an	adversary	state	is	attacked	and	damaged	through	malware	or	viruses,	then	such	an	attack	causes	significant	damage	in	terms	of	tarnishing	 the	 reputation	of	 the	strength	of	 the	national	defense	system	of	that	adversary	state,	as	well	as	in	making	the	security	of	that	 state	 vulnerable	 to	 cyberattacks.145	 Consequently,	 the	adversary	 state	may	never	 engage	 itself	 in	 any	 armed	 endeavor	with	 another	 state	 unless	 it	 has	 reapplied	 the	 security	 on	 its	military	 command	 and	 control	 system.146	 In	 sum,	 the	 malware	attack	 on	 the	 military	 command	 and	 control	 systems	 of	 an	adversary	state	without	the	use	of	actual	military	force	 is	strong	enough	to	deter	any	war	or	armed	attack	by	that	adversary	state.	A	 repeat	 attack	 by	 information	 warriors	 on	 its	 security	 would	further	imperil	its	security	and	defenses	from	malware	attacks	and	further	put	it	into	a	position	of	significant	strategic	disadvantage	compared	to	its	adversaries.	Thus,	the	effectiveness	of	information	warfare	 shows	 how	 substantially	 and	 situationally	 the	wager	 of	information	operations	 can	defeat	 its	 adversary	by	 simply	using	malware	or	virus	attacks.	This	further	illustrates	how	substantially	information	 warfare	 has	 revolutionized	 and	 altered	 the	 face	 of	warfare	in	the	modern	era.147	
B.	Making	the	Internet	the	Battlefield	Information	warfare	is	making	the	internet	or	cyberspace	the	combat	 zone,	 replacing	 conventional	 battlefields.148	 The	information	 operations	 executed	 in	 the	 arena	 of	 information	warfare	do	not	require	the	presence	of	physical	combat	zones	or	real	 battlegrounds.149	 For	 instance,	 the	 use	 of	 social	 media	 and	
 144.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	145.	 Id.	at	1.	146.	 Id.	147.	 See	Lewis,	supra	note	140.	148.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1.	149.	 Id.	at	2.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 923	electronic	 media	 for	 disseminating	 propaganda	 and	disinformation	against	an	adversary,	 the	spread	of	malware	 into	the	strategically	or	economically	important	computer	systems	or	military	 command	 and	 control	 systems	 of	 an	 adversary,	 the	intrusion	 into	 the	 cyberspace	 of	 the	 adversary	 and	 the	 theft	 of	strategically	important	data	of	the	adversary,	etc.	are	some	of	the	examples	of	such	information	operations.150	
C.	Augmenting	the	Effect	of	use	of	Force	in	the	Event	of	an	Armed	
Conflict	Information	 warfare	 can	 also	 be	 deployed	 along	 with	 the	conventional	use	of	force.151	In	such	an	event,	information	warfare	would	enhance	the	impacts	of	the	use	of	force.152	For	example,	as	mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 United	 States	 used	information	warfare	 in	 disseminating	 pamphlets	 in	 Iraq	months	before	attacking	Iraq	in	2003.	That	proved	successful	in	fulfilling	the	 objectives	 of	 the	 United	 States	 to	minimize	 resistance	 from	Iraqi	forces	and	from	Iraqi	citizens,	which	helped	the	US	forces	to	take	over	the	entire	Iraqi	territory	with	no	significant	trouble.153	It	 is	 pertinent	 to	 mention	 here	 that	 information	 warfare	tactics—when	waged	 alongside	 the	 conventional	 use	 of	military	force	in	an	armed	attack	against	an	adversary—can	cause	immense	damage	 to	 the	 adversary	 and	 can	 give	 the	 attacker	 a	 significant	competitive	advantage	over	the	adversary	in	an	armed	conflict.	For	instance,	 the	 attacker	 can	 introduce	 malware	 into	 jet	 fighter	computer	systems,	which	may	cause	them	to	behave	abnormally	or	 crash,	 causing	 colossal	 financial	 losses	 to	 the	adversary,154	or	putting	their	air	force	at	a	significant	competitive	disadvantage.155	Thus,	information	operations	when	deployed	alongside	the	use	of	force	can	make	the	latter	more	potent	and	impactful	in	an	armed	conflict	against	an	adversary.	
 150.	 Id.	151.	 See	Thom,	supra	note	111,	at	46.	152.	 Markku	 Jokisipila,	 E-Jihad,	 Cyberterrorism	 and	 Freedom	 of	 Speech,	 in	 WAR,	VIRTUAL	WAR	AND	SOCIETY:	THE	CHALLENGE	TO	COMMUNITIES	94	(Andrew	R.	Wilson	&	Mark	L.	Perry	eds.,	2008).	153.	 See	Thom,	supra	note	111,	at	46.	154.	 See	Robbat,	supra	note	7,	at	13.	155.	 Id.	
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D.	Information	Warfare	as	an	Element	of	Hybrid	Warfare	Hybrid	 warfare	 is	 a	 mixture	 of	 different	 overt	 and	 covert	activities	 carried	 out	 with	 or	 without	 the	 use	 of	 conventional	military	 force.156	 Hybrid	 warfare	 also	 employs	 kinetic	 and	 non-kinetic,	asymmetric,	and	unconventional	means	of	warfare	as	part	of	 its	 hybrid	 strategy.157	 In	 this	 regard,	 hybrid	 warfare	 also	employs	information	as	a	weapon	waged	by	an	entity	against	 its	adversary.158	In	such	a	scenario,	information	as	a	weapon	is	waged	as	propaganda,	disinformation,	fake	news,	or	defamation.159	All	of	these	activities	are	also	the	tactics	of	information	warfare,	creating	an	 overlapping	 of	 strategies	 between	 hybrid	 warfare	 and	information	warfare.160	As	hybrid	warfare	is	a	broader	spectrum	of	strategies	 involving	 the	 tactics	 of	 information	warfare,	 it	 can	 be	asserted	 that	 information	 warfare	 is	 an	 element	 of	 hybrid	warfare.161	Concomitantly,	several	states	as	well	as	nonstate	actors	are	using	information	warfare	in	their	endeavors	of	hybrid	warfare	against	their	adversaries.162	Information	 warfare	 tactics,	 when	 employed	 in	 hybrid	warfare,	 make	 hybrid	 warfare	 more	 lethal	 and	 severe.163	 For	instance,	 when	 certain	 activities	 such	 as	 propaganda	 is	 waged	through	 news	 or	 social	media	 against	 an	 adversary,	 then	 it	 can	have	the	tendency	to	malice	the	reputation	of	the	adversary.164	In	particular,	when	propaganda	is	spread	out	in	a	way	that	it	creates	a	convincing	air	among	the	viewers	against	the	adversary,	then	the	
 156.	 Ambassador	 Sorin	 Dumitru	 Ducaru,	 Framing	 NATO’s	 Approach	 to	 Hybrid	
Warfare,	in	COUNTERING	HYBRID	THREATS:	LESSONS	LEARNED	FROM	UKRAINE	4	(Niculae	Iancu	et	al.	eds.,	2016).	157.	 See	 Andrés	 B.	 Muñoz	 Mosquera	 &	 Sascha	 Dov	 Bachmann,	 Understanding	
Lawfare	in	a	Hybrid	Warfare	Context,	37	NATO	LEGAL	GAZETTE	22	(2016).	158.	 See	Furgacz,	supra	note	3.	159.	 Id.	See	also	Barna,	supra	note	4.	160.	 See	Barna,	supra	note	4.	161.	 Id.	See	also	Furgacz,	supra	note	3.	162.	 See	Barna,	supra	note	4.	163.	 For	example,	see	how	the	Russia	made	its	hybrid	war	in	Ukraine	more	stringent	and	effective	in	Ukraine	because	Russia	captured	the	entire	Crimean	region,	as	described	in:	 Sascha	 Dov	 Bachmann	 &	 Andres	 B.	 Munoz	 Mosquera,	Hybrid	 Warfare	 as	 Lawfare:	
Towards	a	Comprehensive	Legal	Approach,	in	A	CIVIL-MILITARY	RESPONSE	TO	HYBRID	THREATS	67	(Eugenio	Cusumano	&	Marian	Corbe	eds.,	2017).	164.	 Id.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 925	reputation	of	the	adversary	becomes	tarnished	causing	 it	 to	 lose	support	from	the	international	community.165	On	 the	 other	 hand,	when	 other	 information	warfare	 tactics	such	 as	 DDoS	 attacks	 and	 hacking	 are	 employed	 in	 an	 armed	conflict,	 then	 the	 adversary	 is	put	 into	 a	position	of	 competitive	disadvantage	in	the	conflict.166	For	instance,	 if	 the	command	and	control	system	of	an	adversary	is	attacked	through	DDoS	attacks	or	 hacking	 and	 is	 controlled	 against	 the	 adversary,	 then	 the	adversary	may	 face	 significant	 damage.167	 This	will	 also	 put	 the	adversary	 into	 a	 losing	 position	 in	 an	 armed	 conflict.	 Similarly,	when	 the	 adversary	 is	 unable	 to	 defend	 its	 strategic	 computer	systems	from	the	DDOS	attacks,	then	such	an	attack	damages	the	reputation	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 defense	 system	 of	 the	adversary.168	The	damage	to	the	repute	puts	the	adversary	into	a	position	 of	 competitive	 and	 strategic	 disadvantage	 against	 its	rivals.169	 Thus,	 the	 information	 operations	 of	 DDoS	 attacks	 will	become	an	element	of	hybrid	warfare	due	to	the	covert	nature	of	the	operation.	The	situation	will	then	highlight	that	a	DDoS	attack	may	have	 installed	the	hybrid	warfare	against	 the	affected	party	through	employing	information	operations.	In	sum,	information	warfare	has	revolutionized	the	facets	of	conventional	 warfare.170	 It	 has	 taken	 the	 warfare	 out	 of	 the	conventional	 battlefield	 and	 into	 the	 arena	 of	 the	 internet.171	Cyberspace	has	become	 the	new	battlespace,	where	 information	warriors	 can,	 without	 shedding	 opposing	 soldiers’	 blood,	 cause	significant	 intangible	 damage	 to	 an	 adversary	 by	 destroying	 its	reputation,	 by	 stealing	 its	 strategically	 important	 data,	 or	 by	making	its	security	systems	vulnerable	to	attacks.172	Furthermore,	information	 warfare	 has	 given	 support	 to	 the	 overt	 and	 covert	
 165.	 Id.	See	also	Furgacz,	supra	note	3.	166.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1–2.	167.	 Id.	at	2.	168.	 Id.	169.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1–2.	170.	 See	Lewis,	supra	note	140.	171.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1.	172.	 Id.	
 
926	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	operability	of	hybrid	warfare.173	Notably,	information	warfare	has	also	enhanced	the	lethality	of	hybrid	warfare	in	the	contemporary	era.174	States	and	nonstate	actors	now	wage	hybrid	warfare	by	only	relying	upon	information	warfare	tactics	and	using	information	as	a	weapon	against	their	adversaries.175	Hence,	information	warfare	has	made	hybrid	warfare	as	easier.176	
V.	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	AND	INFORMATION	WARFARE	This	Part	of	the	Article	includes	an	explanation	of	the	relevant	rules	 of	 international	 law	 that	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 sphere	 of	information	warfare.	Some	of	these	rules—for	instance	the	Outer	Space	Treaty	1967—end	up	 indirectly	 facilitating	 the	 conditions	that	 support	 the	 continuation	 of	 information	 warfare,	 leaving	information	warfare	 unchecked	 under	 international	 law.	 On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	 complex	 and	 variegated	 arena	 of	 information	warfare	 makes	 it	 challenging	 for	 international	 norms	 and	principles	 to	 regulate	and	control	 information	operations.177	For	instance,	although	the	 law	of	war,	 the	 law	of	armed	conflict,	and	IHL	make	attempts	 to	regulate	 the	conduct	of	actors	 involved	 in	information	 warfare,	 the	 intangibility	 of	 the	 damage	 caused	 by	information	 warfare	 makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 IHL	 to	 impose	restrictions	on	information	warfare.178		
A.	The	Law	of	War	The	law	of	war	or	the	law	of	armed	conflict	protects	civilians	and	noncombatants	 in	 an	armed	conflict.179	 Likewise,	 the	 law	of	war	 also	 attempts	 to	 protect	 civilians	 from	 any	 information	warfare	attack.	That	is,	the	parties	engaged	in	information	warfare	
 173.	 For	 example,	 see	 how	 the	 disinformation	 campaign	 by	 Russia	 helped	 it	 to	achieve	its	objective	in	its	hybrid	warfare	endeavor	in	Ukraine,	as	described	in	Bachmann	&	Mosquera,	supra	note	163,	at	67.	174.	 See,	e.g.,	id.	175.	 See	Furgacz,	supra	note	3.	See	also	Barna,	supra	note	4.	176.	 For	example,	see	how	the	Russia	achieved	its	objective	in	Crimea,	as	described	in	Bachmann	&	Mosquera,	supra	note	163,	at	67.	177.	 See	Robbat,	supra	note	7,	at	8.	See	also	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	iii.	178.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	179.	 See	 YORAM	 DINSTEIN,	 THE	 CONDUCT	 OF	 HOSTILITIES	 UNDER	 THE	 LAW	 OF	INTERNATIONAL	ARMED	CONFLICT	29	(2004).	
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 927	must	cause	no	harm	to	the	civilian	population.180	This	rule	can	be	applied	 to	 the	 activity	 of	 hacking	 or	 the	 disruption	 of	 any	technological	 transmission	 of	 an	 adversary	 state	 by	 a	 wager	 of	information	warfare.181	 If	 such	an	activity	harms	civilians	 in	any	manner—for	 instance	 in	 disrupting	 their	 businesses,	 daily	routines,	etc.—then	such	an	activity	ought	to	be	considered	illegal	under	 IHL	 or	 the	 law	 of	 war.182	 Several	 other	 inferences	 can	similarly	 be	made	 that	 could	 ensure	protection	 for	 civilians	 and	noncombatants.183	
B.	Challenges	Faced	by	International	Law	in	Regulating	
Information	Warfare	In	fact,	there	are	many	challenges	faced	by	international	law,	in	particular	by	 IHL	or	 the	 law	of	war,	 in	regulating	 information	warfare.184	These	challenges	mainly	derive	from	the	intangibility	of	the	damage	brought	up	by	information	warfare.	Unfortunately,	because	of	such	challenges,	 international	 law	becomes	paralyzed	in	an	attempt	to	regulate	or	control	the	broad	and	complicated	field	of	information	warfare.185		1.	Intangibility	The	 essential	 challenge	 to	 international	 law	 posed	 by	information	warfare	 is	 the	 intangibility	of	 the	damage	caused	by	the	 information	 operations	 instituted	 by	 an	 entity	 against	 its	adversary.186	International	law,	in	particular	the	international	law	of	armed	conflict,	is	silent	on	any	intangible	damage	caused	to	an	adversary	 in	 times	 of	 war	 and	 peace.187	 Therefore,	 it	 becomes	difficult	 for	 international	 law	 to	 regulate	 or	 restrict	 those	information	 operations	 that	 specifically	 produce	 intangible	damages	in	times	of	war	and	peace.188	
 180.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	10–11.	181.	 Id.	at	11.	182.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	12.	183.	 Id.	184.	 Robbat,	supra	note	7,	at	8.	185.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	453.	186.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	187.	 Id.	188.	 Id.	
 
928	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	a.	Unregulated	Intangible	Damage	What	exactly	is	included	under	the	term	“intangible	damage”	varies	according	 to	 the	mode	of	 information	operation	 launched	against	an	adversary;	for	instance,	when	the	media	is	used	to	wage	propaganda	against	an	adversary	or	when	social	media	is	relied	on	for	defaming	an	adversary,	 the	 intangibility	 resides	 in	damaging	the	 reputation	 of	 the	 adversary.189	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	disinformation	 is	used	as	 a	weapon	of	 information	warfare,	 it	 is	intangible	in	terms	of	depriving	the	people	of	the	true	information	and	facts	about	a	certain	aspect	or	activity	in	times	of	war	or	peace.	In	 all	 of	 these	 instances,	 the	 damage	 is	 not	 physical	 or	 tangible,	which	 ultimately	 excludes	 the	 principles	 of	 international	 law	 as	inapplicable	 to	 such	 situations.190	 Consequently,	 it	 becomes	impossible	 to	 regulate	 such	 activities	 of	 information	 warfare	pursued	by	an	entity	against	its	adversary.191	b.	Intangibility	Leading	to	Tangible	Damage	There	are	certain	exceptions	in	which	the	intangible	damage	sometimes	leads	to	tangible	damage	as	well.	For	instance,	when	the	cyberspace	of	the	adversary	is	intruded	via	introducing	malware	or	 a	 virus	 to	 the	 strategically	 important	 software	 systems	 of	 an	adversary,	the	intangible	damage	can	produce	some	tangible	loss	in	terms	of	damage	of	infrastructure	or	loss	of	human	lives.192	For	example,	hacking	the	jet	fighters	of	an	adversary	or	attacking	them	with	malware	can	cause	colossal	 financial	 loss	as	well	as	human	casualties.193	 However,	 international	 law	 does	 not	 provide	sufficient	guidance	on	such	conduct	of	states	in	times	of	war	and	fails	 to	 restrict	 such	 activities	 unless	 they	 result	 in	 harming	noncombatants.194	Thus,	 in	reality,	 there	exist	significant	gaps	 in	international	 law	 in	 regulating	 the	 activities	 of	 information	warfare.195	
 189.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4-5.	190.	 Id.	at	4.	191.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	453.	192.	 See	Robbat,	supra	note	7,	at	13.	193.	 Id.	194.	 Id.	195.	 Id.	See	also	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	453.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 929	2.	The	Inherent	Right	to	Freedom	of	Opinion	and	Expression	When	information	warriors	use	the	media	or	social	media		to	wage	propaganda	or	spread	disinformation	among	the	public,	then	the	 individual’s	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 opinion	 and	 expression	becomes	 relevant	 in	 providing	 the	 freedom	 to	 information	warriors	 in	 using	 the	 media	 or	 social	 media	 to	 spread	 the	narratives	 they	 prefer	 against	 their	 adversary.196	 The	 right	 to	freedom	 of	 opinion	 and	 expression	 is	 protected	 under	 the	Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 passed	 by	 the	 United	Nations	 in	 1948.197	 The	 text	 of	 Article	 19	 of	 the	 Universal	Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 affirms	 the	 right	 in	 the	 following	words:	 “Everyone	 has	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 opinion	 and	expression;	 this	right	 includes	 freedom	to	hold	opinions	without	interference	and	to	seek,	receive	and	impart	information	and	ideas	through	 any	media	 and	 regardless	 of	 frontiers.”198	 In	 particular,	Article	19	permits	no	interference	in	the	freedom	of	expression	of	an	 individual.199	 The	 part	 of	 the	 text	 stating	 “freedom	 to	 hold	opinions	 without	 interference,”	 thus,	 makes	 it	 challenging	 for	international	 law	 to	 restrict	 any	 opinion	 or	 expression	 that	 is	expressed	 within	 the	 spirit	 of	 Article	 19	 of	 the	 Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights.200	As	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	is	an	essential	element	of	customary	international	law,	it	is	therefore	customary	international	 law	 that	 promotes	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	of	 opinion	and	 expression.201	 This	 assertion	 further	 restricts	 international	law	 in	 regulating	 or	 controlling	 any	 activity	 of	 information	warriors	 carried	 out	 in	 pursuance	 of	 their	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	opinion	and	expression.	The	only	thing	that	can	prevent	them	from	exploiting	 their	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 opinion	 and	 expression	 for	information	 warfare	 is	 the	 adversary	 legally	 proving	 their	
 196.	 See,	 e.g.,	NANCY	SNOW,	THE	ARROGANCE	OF	AMERICAN	POWER:	WHAT	U.S.	LEADERS	ARE	DOING	WRONG	AND	WHY	IT’S	OUR	DUTY	TO	DISSENT	3	(2007).	197.	 See	TIM	CROOK,	COMPARATIVE	MEDIA	LAW	AND	ETHICS	33	(2009).	198.	 See	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 G.A.	 Res.	 217	 (III)	 A,	 U.N.	 Doc.	A/RES/217(III)	(Dec.	10,	1948)	[hereinafter	UDHR].		199.	 Id.	200.	 Id.	201.	 See	OLIVIER	DE	SCHUTTER,	 INTERNATIONAL	HUMAN	RIGHTS	LAW:	CASES,	MATERIALS,	COMMENTARY	50	(2010).	See	also	MARTIN	DIXON,	CASES	&	MATERIALS	ON	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	209	(2016).	
 
930	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	expression	of	opinion	to	be	defamatory	by	filing	lawsuits	against	them	 in	 a	 court	 following	 the	 international	 legal	 protocols.202	Through	 this,	 information	 warriors	 can	 be	 legally	 restricted	 in	expressing	 their	 opinions	 if	 such	 opinions	 are	 proved	 legally	 in	court	 to	 be	 hate	 crime	 or	 utterly	 defamatory.203	 Otherwise,	 the	inherent	right	to	freedom	of	opinion	and	expression	is	exploited	or	misused	 by	 information	 warriors	 as	 a	 weapon.	 Hence,	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 tactics	 of	 information	warfare	 and	 the	right	to	freedom	of	opinion	and	expression	under	Article	19	of	the	UDHR	 becomes	 challenging	 for	 international	 law,	 preventing	 it	from	regulating	and	controlling	information	warfare.		This	leads	to	a	perpetual	continuation	of	information	operations	by	states	and	nonstate	actors	against	their	adversaries.	3.	The	Outer	Space	Treaty	and	the	CHM	Principle	The	Treaty	on	Principles	Governing	the	Activities	of	States	in	the	Exploration	and	Use	of	Outer	Space	 Including	 the	Moon	and	Other	 Celestial	 Bodies,	 commonly	 known	 as	 the	 Outer	 Space	Treaty,	was	formally	ratified	in	October	1967.204	According	to	this	treaty,	space	and	all	celestial	objects	are	the	common	heritage	of	the	whole	of	mankind.205	A	similar	principle	has	been	presented	by	the	Moon	Treaty,	which	was	approved	in	1979.206	According	to	the	Moon	 Treaty,	 the	 moon	 and	 all	 its	 resources	 are	 the	 common	property	 of	 the	whole	 of	mankind.207	Therefore,	 from	 these	 two	treaties,	 it	 can	 be	 asserted	 that	 space	 and	 the	 resources	 of	 its	celestial	 objects	 including	 the	 moon	 are	 free	 to	 use.208	 This	assertion	was	given	under	the	CHM	principle,	which	states	that	any	object	or	property	that	is	common	to	the	whole	of	mankind	must	
 202.	 For	 instance,	 see	 some	 examples	 and	 discussion	 about	 defamation	 cases	 as	described	 in	 DAVID	 STRECKFUSS,	 TRUTH	 ON	 TRIAL	 IN	 THAILAND:	 DEFAMATION,	 TREASON,	 AND	LÈSE-MAJESTÉ	1	(2010).	203.	 See	id.	at	414.	204.	 Stephan	Hobe,	Technological	Development	as	a	Challenge	for	the	Development	of	
Air	and	Space	Law,	in	A	NEW	INTERNATIONAL	LEGAL	ORDER	296	(Chia-Jui	Cheng	ed.,	2016).	
See	also	FRANCIS	LYALL	&	PAUL	B.	LARSEN,	SPACE	LAW	53	(2016).	205.	 See	 also	 PRUE	 TAYLOR,	 AN	 ECOLOGICAL	 APPROACH	 TO	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW:	RESPONDING	TO	THE	CHALLENGES	OF	CLIMATE	CHANGE	259	(2008).	206.	 Id.	207.	 Id.	208.	 Id.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 931	be	free	to	be	used	by	all	nations.209	The	CHM	principle	alongside	the	 Outer	 Space	 Treaty	 is	 applicable	 to	 information	 warfare,	because	most	information	operations	are	carried	out	through	the	transmission	of	radio	waves,	which	travel	through	space.210	That	is,	whether	it	is	the	telecasting	of	news	from	a	radio	or	television	channel,	 the	 spreading	 of	 information	 through	 social	 media	platforms,	or	the	intrusion	of	cyberspace	through	hacking	via	the	internet,	 radio	 waves	 are	 employed,	 transmitted	 from	 artificial	satellites	 sent	 to	 space	 by	 the	 major	 international	telecommunication	 agencies	 or	 by	 some	 governments.211	 Hence,	whenever	 any	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 activities	 of	 information	warfare	take	place,	space	becomes	the	medium	of	transmission	of	radio	waves	 and,	 hence,	 facilitates	 the	 pathways	 of	 information	operations.	Concomitantly,	as,	in	accordance	with	the	Outer	Space	Treaty	and	the	CHM	principle,	space	is	the	common	property	of	the	entire	mankind	and	is	free	to	use	for	all	humanity,	the	utilization	of	space	 is	 therefore	 free	 for	 everyone,	 even	 for	 carrying	 out	information	 warfare	 operations.212	 Hence,	 indirectly,	 the	 Outer	Space	Treaty	and	the	CHM	principle	provide	 legal	protection	 for	the	continuation	of	information	warfare	operations.	Thus,	international	law	has	stringent	limitations	in	regulating	the	 sphere	of	 information	warfare.213	The	 limitations	are	mainly	attributed	to	the	intangibility	of	the	damage	caused	by	information	warfare.214	The	intangibility	is	not	addressed	in	the	international	law	 of	 armed	 conflict;	 therefore,	 how	 to	 regulate	 the	 arena	 of	information	 warfare	 becomes	 uncertain.215	 Furthermore,	international	protection	of	the	inherent	right	to	freedom	of	opinion	and	expression—as	constituted	in	Article	19	of	the	UDHR—further	consolidates	the	 inability	 in	 international	 law	to	regulate	certain	
 209.	 GILLIAN	 DOREEN	 TRIGGS	 &	 JOHN	 ROBERT	 VICTOR	 PRESCOTT,	 INTERNATIONAL	FRONTIERS	AND	BOUNDARIES:	LAW,	POLITICS	AND	GEOGRAPHY	402	(2008).	210.	 For	instance,	as	described	by	Medoff	and	Kaye	that	every	media	company	relies	on	satellite	telecommunication	for	transmission	of	information.	Satellite	communication	employs	 radio	 waves.	 For	 details,	 see	 NORMAN	 J.	 MEDOFF	 &	 BARBARA	 KAYE,	 ELECTRONIC	MEDIA:	THEN,	NOW,	AND	LATER	9	(2016).		211.	 See	 id.	 See	 also	 DIANE	 POREMSKY	 &	 SHERRY	 KINKOPH	 GUNTER,	 OUTLOOK	 2013	ABSOLUTE	BEGINNER’S	GUIDE	46	(2013).	212.	 See	TAYLOR,	supra	note	205.	213.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	453.	214.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	215.	 Id.	
 
932	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	information	operations	such	as	the	waging	of	propaganda	against	an	adversary	 through	media	or	social	media.216	Additionally,	 the	Outer	Space	Treaty	and	the	CHM	principle	allow	the	dissemination	of	 information	 through	 the	 radio	 waves	 transmitted	 from	 the	artificial	 satellites	 sent	 into	 space,	 even	 if	 such	 information	 is	deployed	 or	 used	 by	 information	 warriors	 in	 their	 respective	information	 operations.217	 Thus,	 indirectly,	 or	 inadvertently,	international	 law	 appears	 to	 facilitate	 information	 operations	instead	of	regulating	or	controlling	them.	Therefore,	it	has	become	problematic	 for	 international	 legal	 experts	 to	 devise	 ways	 to	control	information	operations.218	
VI.	SUGGESTIONS	TO	REGULATE	INFORMATION	WARFARE	The	legal	challenges	 in	regulating	 information	warfare	need	to	be	addressed	and	evaluated	by	the	international	community	to	control	 the	 threatening	 rise	 of	 information	 operations	 by	 states	and	nonstate	actors	waging	information	warfare	or	hybrid	warfare	against	 their	 adversaries.	 This	 Part	 of	 the	Article	 includes	 some	suggestions	for	paving	the	way	to	regulating	information	warfare	to	 bring	 it	 under	 the	 legal	 authority	 of	 international	 law.	 One	suggestion	is	to	enact	new	laws,	rules,	and	principles	as	well	as	to	draft	a	new	convention	to	not	only	regulate	 information	warfare	but	also	eliminate	the	challenges	caused	by	the	other	treaties	and	principles	 of	 international	 law	 in	 controlling	 the	 arena	 of	information	warfare.219	
A.	Enact	New	Laws,	Rules,	and	Principles	At	present,	there	is	no	particular	set	of	rules	or	policies	under	the	wide	umbrella	of	international	law	that	could	define	or	regulate	information	 operations.220	 The	 legal	 vacuum	 is	 massive	 in	 this	regard,	 and	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 closed	 to	 discourage	 the	 harmful	employment	of	information	warfare.221	This	vacuum	can	be	filled	
 216.	 See	UDHR,	supra	note	198,	art.	19.		217.	 See	MEDOFF	&	KAYE,	supra	note	210.	See	also	TAYLOR,	supra	note	205.	218.	 GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	219.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	439.	220.	 Id.	221.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	453.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 933	if	 new	 rules	 or	 principles	 are	 devised	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	international	 law	 to	 regulate	 the	 conduct	 of	 parties	 engaged	 in	information	 warfare.222	 For	 this	 purpose,	 the	 existing	 laws	 and	principles	 pertaining	 to	 curbing	 hate	 speech	 can	 be	 made	 the	foundations	for	enacting	the	new	laws.223	A	pertinent	collaboration	of	the	international	community	might	prove	helpful	in	this	regard	as	certain	states,	e.g.,	European	and	Scandinavian	states,	may	share	their	 successful	 experiences	 in	 curbing	 hate	 speech,	disinformation,	and	propaganda	in	their	domestic	arenas.224	Here,	states	should	also	collaborate	with	one	another	to	discuss	various	aspects,	 tools,	 and	 areas	 on	 which	 special	 legal	 controls	 are	required	 for	 regulating	 the	 complicated	 arena	 of	 information	warfare.225	For	instance,	the	use	of	the	media	to	disseminate	false	information	 is	 an	 active	 platform	 for	 the	wagers	 of	 information	warfare	against	their	adversaries.226	Therefore,	this	platform	has	to	be	analyzed	and	then	carefully	regulated	in	a	manner	that	not	only	protects	the	necessary	freedom	of	opinion	and	expression,	but	also	 controls	 any	 kind	 of	 negative	 activity	 pursued	 through	 the	media	within	 the	 sphere	 of	 information	warfare.	 It	 is	 suggested	that	 a	 special	 code	 of	 conduct	 has	 to	 be	 formulated	 at	 the	international	level,	drafted	particularly	for	the	international	news	media	 agencies,	 to	 prevent	 or	 criminalize	 the	 propagation	 of	
 222.	 Id.	at	439.	223.	 For	example,	as	described	in	this	book	about	the	defamation	laws	controlling	hate	speech:	STRECKFUSS,	supra	note	202,	at	1	(see	also	pages	103	and	414	of	the	same	book.	Such	laws	can	be	enacted	and	made	prominent	at	the	international	level	for	regulating	the	hate	speech,	defamation,	and	disinformation	activities	of	information	warriors).	224.	 Western	 European	 nations	 and	 Scandinavian	 states	 have	 been	 regarded	 as	having	 adopted	 the	 laws	 curbing	 hate	 speeches	 alongside	 protecting	 the	 freedom	 of	opinion	and	expression.	The	legislators	of	these	nations	should	be	consulted	about	new	rules	and	principles	for	regulating	the	activities	of	information	war.	For	details	about	EU	hate	speech	laws,	see	Sejal	Parmer,	The	Legal	Framework	for	Addressing	“Hate	Speech”	in	Europe,	at	3,	presented	in	Addressing	Hate	Speech	in	the	Media:	The	Role	of	Regulatory	Authorities	 and	 the	 Judiciary,	 in	 the	 International	 Conference	 Organized	 by	 Council	 of	Europe	in	Partnership	with	the	Croatian	Agency	for	Electronic	Media	(Nov.	6–7,	2018).	225.	 For	instance,	see	a	recent	special	regulation	in	Europe	for	curbing	hate	speech:	William	New,	New	EU	Directive	Limits	Hate	Speech,	Establishes	European	Content	Quotas,	INTELL.	 PROP.	 WATCH	 (Nov.	 6,	 2018,)	 https://www.ip-watch.org/2018/11/06/new-eu-directive-limits-hate-speech-establishes-european-content-quotas	[https://perma.cc/DF5D-7QDB].	226.	 For	example,	as	described	by	Vuuren	et	al.,	supra	note	17,	at	127.	
 
934	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	propaganda	 and	 hate	 speech.227	 The	 new	 regulations	 should	include	 the	 curbing	 of	 negative	 propaganda	 against	 states,	religions,	races,	ethnic	communities,	etc.	Whether	such	a	policy	is	implemented	assertively	or	normatively	is	another	question	to	be	dealt	with	and	one	that	the	international	community	has	to	decide	after	 evaluating	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 each	strategy.	Nonetheless,	 the	rules	and	principles	aiming	at	curbing	fake	news,	hate	speech,	and	propaganda	may	be	implemented	in	a	normative	sense,	but	their	normativity	may	make	them	assertive	in	 the	 future	 if	 the	 entire	 international	 community	 or	 even	 the	United	 Nations	 ends	 up	 positively	 endorsing	 them.	 Thus,	 in	 the	same	way,	 all	 other	 aspects	of	 information	warfare	 can	be	dealt	with	and	regulated.	
B.	Arrange	a	New	Convention:	The	Need	of	the	Hour	At	 present,	 there	 is	 no	 single	 convention	 on	 the	 issue	 of	regulating	 information	warfare.228	On	 the	other	hand,	 states	and	nonstate	 actors	 have	 started	 actively	 relying	 on	 the	 use	 of	information	warfare	 tactics	against	 their	rivals,229	which	poses	a	serious	 threat	 to	 international	 peace	 and	 security.	 In	 particular	when	terrorists	wage	information—as	the	Taliban	benefitted	from	resorting	to	information	warfare	alongside	their	lawfare	strategy	against	 the	 NATO	 forces	 in	 Afghanistan,230—	 it	 consequently	undermines	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 operations	 against	 them.	 As	previously	stated,	 the	Taliban	now	have	control	of	nearly	half	of	the	 territory	 of	 Afghanistan.231	 Thus,	 because	 of	 such	 threats,	international	 legal	 experts	have	 raised	 their	 voices	 and	 scholars	endorse	 the	 arrangement	 of	 a	 new	 international	 policy	 or	convention	 to	 regulate	 the	 growing	phenomenon	of	 information	warfare	 in	 the	contemporary	era.232	Though	these	calls	have	not	
 227.	 For	example,	 as	 such	a	policy	has	been	 recently	 implemented	 in	Europe.	For	details,	see	New,	supra	note	225.	228.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	453.	229.	 Cristian	 Barna,	 The	 Road	 to	 Jihad	 in	 Syria:	 Using	 SOCMINT	 to	 Counter	 the	
Radicalization	 of	 Muslin	 Youth	 in	 Romania,	 in	 COUNTERING	 RADICALIZATION	 AND	 VIOLENT	EXTREMISM	AMONG	YOUTH	TO	PREVENT	TERRORISM	193	(Marco	Lombardi	et	al.	eds.,	2015).	230.	 Dunlap,	Jr.,	supra	note	121,	at	36.	231.	 Nordland	et	al.,	supra	note	133.	232.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	439.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 935	gained	momentum	so	 far,	 the	 rationality	and	practicality	behind	them	are	quite	convincing,	and	 the	world	needs	 to	consider	 this	earnestly.233	If	 the	 calls	 for	 a	 new	 convention	 on	 regulating	 information	warfare	 are	 heard	 positively	 and	 a	 new	 convention	 is	 arranged,	then	the	convention	would	provide	a	new	and	rigorous	forum	for	analyzing	 and	 regulating	 the	 different	 arenas	 of	 information	warfare.	In	particular,	it	would	provide	a	special	forum	for	states,	legal	 experts,	 and	 the	 bodies	 of	 international	 law	 to	 discuss	 the	various	aspects	of	information	warfare	and	listen	to	one	another’s	suggestions	 for	 regulating	 it.	 Consequently,	 they	 could	unanimously	 devise	 a	 new	 code	 of	 conduct	 or	 rules	 to	 regulate	information	 operations.234	 Additionally,	 it	 would	 also	 close	 the	existing	 loopholes	 in	 international	 law,	 which	 are	 indirectly	facilitating	 information	 warfare—for	 instance	 the	 Outer	 Space	Treaty235.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 the	 need	 of	 the	 hour	 to	 arrange	 a	 new	convention	 to	 bring	 information	warfare	 under	 the	 authority	 of	international	legal	norms,	rules,	or	principles,	as	doing	so	will	help	mitigate	 the	 threats	 posed	 by	 information	 operations	 to	international	peace	and	security.236	
VII.	CONCLUSION	In	 the	 contemporary	 era	 of	 technological	 advancement,	information	 warfare	 is	 being	 deployed	 by	 states	 and	 nonstate	actors	against	their	adversaries.237	Information	warfare	entails	the	dissemination	 of	 manipulated	 information	 or	 the	 access	 to	particular	information	and	then	using	that	information	to	acquire	competitive	 advantage	 over	 an	 adversary.238	 Some	 examples	 of	information	 warfare	 include	 the	 spreading	 of	 propaganda	 or	disinformation	 through	 the	 use	 of	 mass	 media,	 the	 spread	 of	malware	 or	 viruses	 into	 computerized	 military	 command	 and	control	systems	or	other	strategically	 important	 institutions,	 the	theft	of	 important	data	via	hacking,	and	the	demonization	of	 the	
 233.	 Id.	at	453.	234.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	439.	235.	 Id.	236.	 Id.	237.	 See	Barna,	supra	note	4.	238.	 Id.	See	also	Nitu,	supra	note	6.	
 
936	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:4	reputation	of	an	adversary	via	the	use	of	electronic	media	or	social	media	platforms.239	All	of	these	tactics	of	information	warfare	are	revolutionizing	the	 face	 of	warfare	 in	 the	 current	 era.240	 The	war	 is	 now	 being	waged	on	new	fronts,	particularly	on	technological	fronts,	because	states	 and	 institutions	 have	 recognized	 the	 importance	 of	strengthening	the	security	systems	of	their	strategically	important	datasets	 and	 computer	 systems.241	 The	 threat	 from	 hackers	 is	prevalent	 and	 massive;	 they	 can	 cause	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	damage,	 ranging	 from	 destroying	 a	 reputation	 to	 causing	 huge	financial	 losses	and	 theft	of	 confidential	data	 reports.242	For	 this	purpose,	state	institutions	are	deploying	special	security	measures	to	avert	the	threats	of	information	warfare.243	Certain	tactics	of	information	warfare	can	prove	to	be	deadly	for	international	peace	and	security;	 for	 instance,	disinformation	and	 propaganda	 are	 tactics	 that	 can	 aggravate	 tensions	 among	adversary	 states,	 leading	 to	 conflict	 if	 the	 states	 get	 engaged	 in	perpetual	 propaganda	 wars	 against	 each	 other.244	 Furthermore,	the	 tactics	 of	 information	 warfare	 when	 deployed	 by	 terrorist	organizations	 can	 also	 cause	 detrimental	 damage	 to	 regional	 or	international	 peace.245	 	 The	 situation	may	 be	 very	 critical	 if	 the	terrorists	get	their	hands	on	the	hacking	strategy	and	can	spread	malware	or	viruses	or	take	control	remotely	over	the	strategically	important	computer	systems	of	an	adversary	state.246	 In	such	an	event,	the	threat	to	regional	peace	and	damage	to	the	reputation	of	the	security	of	the	state	could	be	massive.	Therefore,	it	is	the	need	of	the	hour	to	regulate	the	tactics	of	information	warfare	before	it	gets	too	late	to	do	so.		Nonetheless,	 despite	 the	 aforementioned	 threats	 to	international	peace	and	security,	there	has	unfortunately	been	no	mechanism,	policy,	or	set	of	rules	devised	at	the	international	level	
 239.	 See	Nitu,	supra	note	6.	See	also	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	2.	240.	 See	LEWIS,	supra	note	140.	241.	 See	GREENBERG	ET	AL.,	supra	note	1,	at	1.	242.	 See,	e.g.,	Greenberg	et	al.,	supra	note	1,	at	2.	243.	 For	example,	see	how	the	Pentagon	is	averting	hacking	threats	in	Konkel,	supra	note	83.	244.	 See	Konkel,	supra	note	83.	245.	 See	id.	246.	 See	id.	
 
2020]	 INFORMATION	WARFARE	 937	that	could	regulate	the	arena	of	information	warfare.247	Moreover,	there	is	not	even	a	single	convention	under	the	wide	umbrella	of	international	law	so	far	that	has	discussed	the	need	to	regulate	or	control	 information	 warfare.248	 Although	 there	 have	 been	 calls	raised	 by	 a	 number	 of	 legal	 experts	 to	 draft	 a	 new	 convention	under	 the	authority	of	 international	 law	to	regulate	 the	arena	of	information	 warfare,	 such	 calls	 have	 not	 gained	 momentum	 so	far.249	A	 trend	seen	over	 the	past	 few	decades	has	been	 that	 the	international	community	does	not	take	into	consideration	calls	for	drafting	a	separate	convention	on	any	issue	unless	that	particular	issue	 becomes	 global	 and	 very	 significant	 in	 nature.250	 Thus,	 no	special	 efforts	 have	 yet	 been	 made	 to	 draft	 either	 a	 separate	convention	 or	 special	 rules	 that	 could	 hear	 the	 calls	 to	 regulate	information	 warfare.251	 It	 can	 only	 be	 hoped	 that—if	 not	 at	present,	 then	 in	 the	 future—the	 calls	 to	 regulate	 information	warfare	will	gain	momentum.																			
 247.	 See	Johnson,	supra	note	9,	at	453.	248.	 Id.	at	439.	249.	 Id.	250.	 Id.	251.	 Id.	at	453.	
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